Amid rising political violence and the growing threat from the radical right in the lead-up to the state elections in Saxony, Germany, various radical-left actors have also taken to the streets to mobilize support for their political objectives. These actors engage with foreign policy issues strategically and criticizes Germany’s government. In addition, the radical-left scene has become more dynamic with the emergence of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party.
Aleš Michal
August 29, 2024
An alarming wave of political violence in Germany is a reminder that political activities and behaviors between elections warrant close attention. For example, in May, politically motivated violence was observed in Berlin, where the former mayor was assaulted, and in Mannheim, where a radicalized individual attacked a radical-right influencer. The authorities have warned about this phenomenon countrywide, but in the new federal states from the former East Germany the democratic transformation and related economic changes have generated a growing support for radical and extremist actors. As in the rest of Europe, the Covid-19 pandemic intensified protest activities in Germany, primarily connected to the radical and extreme right, that continue to influence politics. The increasing support behind these groups has led scholars, in Germany and elsewhere, to overestimate the impact of radical-right protests compared to the influence of actors with other ideological leanings, especially on the radical left. The activities of political peripheries are closely intertwined.
This is the case in the eastern state of Saxony where, alongside the strong presence of the extreme and radical right, left-wing protest activities have intensified and, responding to domestic and international developments, have showed a broadened agenda ahead of the September 1 state elections.
Figure 1. Destroyed AfD poster as a symbol of political battles in Saxon cities. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
In Saxony, the economic and social challenges of the democratic transformation dominated the public agenda following Germany’s reunification, and such topics still prevail in the public space due to persistent gaps in living standards with western states. Political extremes on the left and right are also strongly present. In its May 2024 report, the Saxony branch of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution highlighted left-wing extremism as a severe threat to society and singled out the city of Leipzig as one of the three hotspots of left-wing extremism in the country. Meanwhile, the radical right with its leading force, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, has become comprehensively normalized in Saxony. The polarization between extreme left and extreme right creates a fertile ground for conflicts: while the AfD in Saxony warns against “radical left fanatics”, radical leftists protest against racism and its political proponents.
Concerned by economic divisions, inequality, lasting deep differences, social issues, and a new foreign policy agenda, members of the radical left in Saxony identify two main groups of adversaries. First, they oppose right-wing extremism, primarily represented by the AfD and its strong local organizations. Second, they criticize the federal coalition government of the Social Democratic Party, the Greens, and the liberal Free Democrats for its inadequate support for the socially disadvantaged, its support and military aid for Israel and Ukraine, and for the social democrat’s collaboration with the liberals.
Figure 2. May 1 in Leipzig. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, foreign policy entered the agenda of extremist protest activities with a renewed focus on peacemaking, a term historically central to left-wing politics. In the eastern parts of Germany, including Saxony, the reappearance of the peace rhetoric is reminiscent of communist-ruled East Germany and its warnings against U.S. imperialism. Germany’s support for Ukraine and coordination with NATO and European partners is in sharp contrast with the radical left’s persistent calls for peace and demilitarization. Views on the war in Ukraine have also strongly impacted the radical left with internal disputes culminating in the split of The Left party and the creation of the new radical-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) party. Following the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, Israel and its military operations in Gaza also became a contested topic in the radical left.
Figure 3. BSW meeting in Berlin, June 2023. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
The most influential actors of the radical left in Saxony, the local organizations of the political parties, align ideologically with socialism and communism, underlining the economic disparity between Germany’s western and eastern regions. The stance of The Left, the most influential non-radical-right opposition in Saxony’s regional assembly, which also has a strong representation in municipalities and ability to bring people to the streets, exemplifies these topics well. The party proposes left-wing policies such as free public transport and free lunches for the working class, and in the context of the electoral campaign employs nostalgic communist rhetoric, using slogans like “Völker hört die Signale” (the first line of the German version of The Internationale) or “Auferstanden aus Ruinen” (the opening line of East Germany’s national anthem) on its posters. In contrast, the BSW has almost no visible street presence due to its lack of representation in regional legislative assemblies and, therefore, no access to state funds. Instead, it has focused on meetings with potential voters and personal engagement by its leader, Sahra Wagenknecht. Other minor political parties, like the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany with its motto “Generation Socialism” emphasize mainly the economic conflict between east and west Germans.
Figure 4. Poster of The Left in Leipzig for the European Parliament elections. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
Unlike political parties, radical-left movements in Saxony have decentralized interests, combining regular economic demands with increasing interest in foreign policy. Since October 2023, the conflict between Israel and Hamas became a predominant theme of their protest activities. For example, during the May 1 protests in Leipzig, the economic slogans of radical-left protesters quickly gave way to chants about the conflict, shifting from “International Solidarity” to “Free Palestine”. Furthermore, a group of radical-left pro-Palestine students occupied Leipzig University in the first week of May, following similar events in the United States and in other parts of Germany. The conflict in Gaza became a focal issue also for other radical-left movements: for example, the Revolutionary Socialist Organization perceives the fight against anti-Semitism as the “authoritative propaganda” of the German government and develops collaboration with its peers in Austria. This is a fundamental difference between parties and movements of the radical left: movements with a loose organizational structure have a greater tendency to cooperate with international counterparts. They internationalize their organizations, which then can connect more on the basis of their ideas.
Finally, the local group of Last Generation, a movement without clear communist or socialist affiliation unlike most of the similar groups focused on climate change, has also been visible in Saxony, especially in larger cities. Unlike other movements of the radical left active in the region, Last Generation has a stronger central organization, which enables it to carry out radical actions, mainly against the car industry. But it does not address the international conflicts in its declarations.
Figure 5. Poster of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany in Leipzig. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
Its focus on economic issues suggests that the radical-left opposition front of political parties and social movements aims to leverage topics that resonate with the wider public to voice effective criticism against the current federal government. It strives to balance its rejection of government with resistance to the radical right, while offering new economic programs that emphasize a strong role for the state. The strategic battle between the radical right, which has also been appropriating economic issues in recent years, and the radical left, which is finding new topics, creates a window of opportunity for new actors that manage to blend these agendas. One example is the BSW, which skillfully combines an anti-migration stance more typical of the radical right with some socioeconomic policies typically associated with the left, especially social care, and criticism of capitalism. This approach allows it to attract a broader base of support, drawing from disenchanted left-wing and right-wing voters.
Paradoxically, the results of last June’s local and European Parliament elections in Saxony revealed that these new actors (mainly the BSW) also have the potential to win over new supporters not only from the current parties of the opposition (as seen with the decline of The Left) but also from the governing Social Democratic Party. Voters on the left now have more options to choose from the center to the radical left and are divided among them. Besides, the situation generates new approaches for upholding the cordon sanitaire against the AfD, including campaigns for enhancing voter support for left-wing parties that are barely meeting in the polls the 5 percent threshold necessary to enter the state parliament (mainly the Social Democratic Party, the Green and The Left) and new thinking about potential coalition arrangements.
Figure 6: May 1 protest event in Leipzig. Photo credit: Ales Michal.
To conclude, radical-left protest activities in Saxony are still driven by social movements that use a different rhetoric from that of radical-left parties to push their own agenda. Unlike in the case of political parties, their calls have been aimed mainly at foreign policy issues, such as the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. Political parties and social movements alike agree on the universal importance of peace.
As a rule, political parties have to offer a complex program, which in the case of the radical left typically focuses on economic inequality, social care, and climate politics, whereas social movements can choose their focus more freely. This insight from the examples of radical-left activities in Saxony is widely relevant. Radical-left movements are able to engage with topics that are to a significant extent controversial for parties, which see entering into government as their main goal. This, in turn, deepens the gap between radical-left parties and social movements, and enables the latter to shape their positions on their own. How the two sides will be able to cooperate in the future will be dependent on their evolving positions on long-standing and new issues and their relative importance.
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Aleš Michal is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. His research focuses on definitions of conceptual boundaries of populist and anti-system political space and protest mobilization in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Cover photo credit: Ales Michal
