In Austria, nationalism historically meant support for German unification, and thus, paradoxically, the rejection of an “Austrian nation.” The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) upheld this position after the Second World War. How did this ideology develop? Why was the FPÖ initially liberal, pro-European, and pro-Atlantic in orientation? What role does German nationalism play in contemporary Austrian politics? The article examines how German nationalism emerged and how the FPÖ ultimately replaced it with an illiberal populism.
Péter Techet
December 18, 2024
In October, Walter Rosenkranz was elected president of Austria’s parliament. A politician from the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), he is affiliated with the Vienna-based student fraternity Burschenschaft Libertas. The fraternity’s website prominently displays a black, red, and gold German flag, illustrating how nationalism in Austria can align with German identity.
This orientation is explicitly reinforced in the FPÖ’s current manifesto, which states: “Austria’s language, history, and culture are German. The majority of Austrians belong to the German ethnic, linguistic, and cultural community.” In 1988, then FPÖ leader Jörg Haider expressed this perspective even more bluntly: “You know as well as I do that the Austrian nation was a misbirth [Mißgeburt], an ideological misbirth. Ethnic affiliation is one thing; state affiliation is another.” His remark referred to Austria’s independence as a small state following the First and Second World Wars.
Why has nationalism in Austria historically been “German”? The answer lies in the complex identity of Habsburg and post-Habsburg Austria. German nationalism (Deutschnationalismus) strongly shaped the “third camp,” represented by the FPÖ after 1955, even into the 1990s. However, this influence is less relevant today, Austria’s independent statehood is no longer contested. Instead, the FPÖ’s pragmatic populism—focused on economic self-interest and criticizing migration —can now be framed as “Austrian patriotism.” Nevertheless, there are occasional echoes of old German nationalist elements, as expressed by figures like Rosenkranz. This demonstrates that, while it has waned, overt German nationalism’s historical legacy still subtly shapes Austrian political culture.
Austria: Empire Without a State, State Without a Nation?
The “national question” posed a persistent challenge within Habsburg Austria. The Austrian territories were ethnically and linguistically diverse, making it impossible to base the state on a single national identity. This complex framework fostered a highly formalistic and legalistic approach to statehood, ultimately theorized by Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law. Kelsen argued that a state does not need to rely on a single national identity; instead, it functions as a legal framework capable of encompassing people of various nationalities, religions, and other affiliations. Kelsen wrote that he may have developed this view
because the state that was closest to me, and which I knew best from personal experience, the Austrian state, was clearly only a legal entity. Considering the Austrian state, which was composed of so many groups differing in race, language, religion, and history, theories that attempted to ground the unity of the state in some socio-psychological or socio-biological connection among its citizens (who belong to the same state) clearly proved to be fictions. (Kelsen 1947, 60)
Eric Voegelin later criticized this approach, arguing that the failures of the First Austrian Republic (1919–1934) stemmed from its inability to establish a cohesive national identity: “The unique state problem of the Monarchy continued in the Republic of Austria after 1918: a state entity was established in an era of intense democratic ideas, but without a people possessing a true will for the state.” (Voegelin 1936, 89) Voegelin further contended that “[t]he party organizations play a similar role in the history of the [first] republic as the nationalities did in the monarchy.” (Voegelin 1936, 98)
The “Third Camp”: German Nationalism
Austrian politics during the First Republic was polarized by three principal factions that functioned, according to Voegelin, almost like distinct “national groups”: the Clericals, the Social Democrats, and the National Liberals (or German Nationalists). They traced their origins to the 1882 Program of Linz, a document co-authored by figures such as the future Social Democrat Victor Adler and the anti-Semite Georg von Schönerer. This program advocated a separation of the Austrian territories from the Hungarian ones, and closer alignment between German-speaking regions and the German Reich, establishing it as the foundational text of German nationalism in Austria.
Within the ethnically diverse Habsburg monarchy, the National Liberals adopted a distinctly German-nationalist stance, opposing the monarchy itself and particularly antagonizing Slavic groups within the empire. This “third camp” set itself apart through its anti-Habsburg, anti-clerical, often Protestant, anti-socialist, and nationalist ideals.
The “national question” remained unresolved even after the First World War, and the “third camp” continued to support the idea of Anschluss (annexation) with Germany. During the First Republic, all major political parties, including the Social Democrats, advocated closer ties with Germany. The “third camp” was represented by various parties, the most prominent being the Greater German People’s Party (GVP), which participated in several right-wing coalitions after 1920. The GVP shared ideological ground with the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials. Like the Social Democrats, it endorsed pro-German, anti-clerical, and centralist policies, particularly in debates over marriage law and state structure. At the same time, it aligned with the Christian Socials in its anti-Semitism, anti-socialist stance, and pro-capitalist policies.
German Nationalism and the FPÖ
In the Second Republic established in 1945, the concept of an independent Austria gradually gained acceptance, driven largely by the country’s neutrality and postwar economic recovery. Following the political turmoil of the First Republic, the major political parties sought to build a Second Republic rooted in compromise and free from the deep polarization of the past. However, many former members of the Nazi Party were excluded from participating in politics. In characteristic Austrian understatement, these individuals were referred to as die Ehemaligen (the former ones).
Those who remained loyal to the “third camp” organized in the League of Independents (VdU), which secured nearly 12% of the vote in the 1949 parliamentary elections. The party primarily advocated amnesty for former members of the Nazi Party. In its 1954 manifesto, the VdU explicitly endorsed German nationalism, declaring: “Austria is a German state. Its politics must serve the entire German nation and must never be directed against another German state.” (quoted in Reiter & Ermacora 1982, 247) Following the 1955 State Treaty, which reestablished independence, the issue of sovereignty was pragmatically addressed through neutrality. However, the “third camp” feared neutrality could be used to distance Austria from West Germany, which explains its strongly pro-Western, anti-neutrality stance
The FPÖ was founded in 1955 as the successor to the VdU. It remained a smaller party compared to the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ), drawing its support primarily from high-ranking bureaucrats, freelancers, and small industrialists. Continuities with national socialism were evident in its early leadership. Until 1978, the FPÖ was led by politicians with SS backgrounds: first Anton Reinthaller and later Friedrich Peter. Longtime leader Peter, a former SS-Obersturmführer, sought to reposition the FPÖ during the 1970s as a national-liberal, progressive, and pro-European party. Under the later leadership of Norbert Steger, the FPÖ adopted a strongly liberal orientation and even entered a government coalition with the Social Democrats from 1983 to 1986.
And Then Came Haider…
In 1986, Jörg Haider, a young politician from Carinthia, assumed the leadership of the FPÖ. His ambitions extended beyond leading a party associated with “the former ones.” He shifted the party’s ideology from its liberal, state-critical roots to a more radical, anti-system stance. Positioning himself as a neoliberal critic of Austria’s corporatist Proporzsystem (an informal system of power-sharing that allocates public offices and resources between the two major political parties), Haider aimed to redefine the FPÖ’s identity.
While his rhetoric retained elements of German nationalism and anti-Semitism, Haider began distancing the FPÖ from core aspects of traditional German nationalist ideology. On social issues, the party, which had historically supported progressive ideas, adopted more conservative stances. Furthermore, whereas the party had traditionally supported European and transatlantic integration, Haider’s FPÖ adopted a strong opposition to the European Union and NATO. This populist shift enabled him to broaden the party’s appeal, particularly among working-class voters.
What Remains of German Nationalism?
If it were solely reliant on German nationalist or national-liberal voters, the FPÖ would struggle to maintain a presence in parliament. The national-liberal voter base is relatively small, and these voters have alternative political options. In 1992, the FPÖ’s left-liberal faction, led by Heide Schmidt, split off to form the Liberal Forum (LiF), which later merged with the liberal NEOS party. The latter embraces the liberal traditions of 1848 once championed by the FPÖ, but without the German nationalist undertones.
The FPÖ’s shift away from German nationalism has continued under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache and, more recently, Herbert Kickl. Both have sought to distance the party from anti-Semitism, attempting to reframe its anti-Muslim rhetoric as a form of philo-Semitism. Despite these efforts, there continues to be scandals tied to German nationalist circles. For instance, in October, an SS song was reportedly sung at the funeral of an FPÖ politician. Furthermore, parliament president Rosenkranz continues to uphold traditional German nationalist ideals, which has prompted Jewish organizations to refuse to collaborate with him.
What, then, is the role of German nationalism in today’s FPÖ? It has largely become a matter of folklore rather than a core ideological component. The question of whether Austria belongs to the German nation no longer resonates with voters. However, the essentialist concept of “nation,” rooted in German nationalist thought, continues to influence the FPÖ’s ideology, particularly in its opposition to migration and supranational entities like the European Union.
References:
H. Kelsen 1947, “Autobiographie” [1947], in: Matthias Jestaedt (ed.), Hans Kelsen Werke. Vol. 1, Tübingen 2007, 29.
E. Reiter and F. Ermacora 1982, Programm und Programmentwicklung der FPÖ, Vienna 1982.
E. Voegelin 1936, Der autoritäre Staat. Ein Versuch über das österreichische Staatsproblem, Vienna 1936.
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Author:
Dr. Dr. Péter Techet is research associate at the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (Vienna) and at the University for Continuing Education (Krems), where he is part of the research project “European Dis/Orders”.
The article is based on Péter Techet’s presentation titled “When Nationalism Meant Rejecting the Own Nation – The “Third Camp” and the FPÖ”. It was presented at the workshop “Comparing Illiberal Legacies and Ideological Morphologies” on November 14, 2024, in Budapest. The presentation is available HERE.
The AUTHLIB consortium does not take collective positions. Publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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Photo credit: Nikola Obradovic via Shutterstock
