Authoritarian, illiberal and populist actors are perceived to evoke negative sentiments and to prefer talking about the past rather than the future. A recently published quantitative and qualitative analysis of speeches of two such leaders, Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński, suggests that this is not necessarily so. Their attacks against liberalism and against the West are couched in an upbeat, future-looking discourse, and their deeply ideological arguments are combined with a stress on competence.
Franziska Wagner and Zsolt Enyedi
September 10, 2024
Whether it is in Donald Trump’s angry outbursts, the aggressive statements by Geert Wilders, or the anti-establishment fury of Javier Milei, we tend to see angry leaders as driving the success of the right-wing authoritarian forces. Such images and statements dominate the media, shaping our perception of authoritarianism as fueled primarily by anger and resentment. But perhaps this is only part of the story. What if authoritarianism can also be positive, hopeful, and future-looking? If so, supporters of liberal democracy need to respond differently.
Once in power, authoritarian, populist, and illiberal politicians are faced with a conundrum. On the one hand, they have to channel the fear, anger, envy, and anxiety present in society to fight hostile international elites. On the other hand, they must eventually sell their time in office as a success, convincing the doubters—including voters and foreign investors—that their governance is stable and effective with a promising future. This implies reliance on negative messages in the former case and on positive ones in the latter. So, which logic wins?
To find out, we analyzed 875 speeches by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, given while their parties were in power, in 2010–2023 and 2015–2023 respectively. First, we found that about 70 percent of the sentences of these leaders reflect positive emotions. It seems that the contradictory pressures between the need to express grievances and that to radiate confidence were largely resolved in favor of the latter. But what does this positivity consist of? We looked into this through a topic model analysis on the positive segments of all speeches and analyzed 33 particularly prominent speeches more closely.
Positive Messaging à la Orbán and Kaczyński
In Orbán’s case, we found that even in the positive segments of his speeches he discusses developments he regards as detrimental, such as immigration, the federalization of the European Union, and the “tyrannical rule” of political correctness. Through this framing, Orbán frequently reminds his audience that the West is in decline and Europe’s share of the world economy, population, influence, or technological achievements is rapidly diminishing.
Why should his target audience who are Europeans be happy about this news? How does he nonetheless evoke positive emotions? His principal method is to contrast the West with Central Europe, particularly Hungary, which he portrays as stable thanks to unity, faithfulness to Christian roots, and wise leadership. The claims of competence are intertwined with patriotic slogans and with the insistence that new generations are to be socialized into these values. In essence, while negativity is discursively entangled with the West and in particularly the EU, Hungary and Orbán as its leader emerge as the shining beacon of a hopeful future.
In addition, Orbán advances a moral argument and a realist one, the first emphasizing the ethical virtues of Hungarians, the other highlighting their interests. Even though the logics behind these arguments differ, both convey optimism and confidence. The moral frame posits that historical justice guarantees future satisfaction for the nation, while the realist argument claims illiberal systems are more robust and effective than the liberal democratic ones.
Orbán frequently uses terms like “fight” and “victory” to evoke determination and efficacy. He hints at upcoming conflicts but reassures the audience that Hungary will prevail. He radiates superior knowledge and self-confidence in statements like: “I am going to tell you today what the European Union should do differently in order to banish fear and uncertainty from the lives of the people of Europe.” His speeches frequently portray Hungary as a country that forges its own path and is ultimately vindicated despite opposition. Next to the generic “We can do it” mentality, the speeches express the belief that a working formula has been found: “30 years ago we thought that Europe was our future. Today we believe that we are Europe’s future.”
Similarly to Orbán, Kaczyński claims that the radical transformation he and PiS started in Poland significantly improved social care and education, and re-established national sovereignty. According to him, a more democratic order was achieved, dominated by fundamental Polish values like honor and commitment to family. His understanding of patriotism calls for the defense of the nation’s honor against foreigners’ accusations, such as those concerning the role of Poles in the Holocaust.
Kaczyński’s narrative portrays Poland as David overcoming Goliath, combining excitement with the sense of historical or divine mandate: “Good is again separated from evil. Everything that was done to confuse good and evil is now dwindling.” In a less sharp and aggressive tone, but otherwise converging with Orbán, he presents the EU as a danger to the family and the Catholic church, emphasizing the need for courage: “It is possible to say that today only we and the Hungarians are in favor of change in the European Union, but no one else. […] one should believe that the impossible can be possible. One must believe that we can prevail.”
Kaczyński’s ability to win uphill battles is illustrated with recent experiences, frequently reminding the audience that there was a time when his opponents controlled all key positions: the government, the president, all “the control institutions,” the local authorities, the courts, and the media—and they even had “the support of so-called celebrities.” The situation was dire: “It seemed that we had no chance.” But then, “[w]e showed determination. We showed toughness. And we won! Resistance, toughness, determination were important, necessary, absolutely essential conditions for this victory. But it was also very important that we had invention, that we had ideas, that we were able to show the public, despite the media blockade that there is an alternative.” According to Kaczyński, the “genuinely Polish state” regained power, despite the dark manipulations of the media.
There is very little nostalgia in Kaczyński’s discourse: his speeches are typically forward-looking. The past is dark, the future is bright, and historical difficulties are seen as resources. For example, speaking about the conflict with the EU concerning the independence of the judiciary, he said: “It is difficult, but remember that it is not difficult compared to what it was 103 years ago.”
Despite the similarities, the two leaders differ somewhat in their focus. In contrast to Orbán’s, Kaczyński’s speeches tend to be confined more narrowly to political matters, often discussing procedures and institutions as well as emphasizing fulfilled promises. There is a large overlap in the evoked values, but “honesty” is more central to Kaczyński’s discourse than to Orbán’s. They converge primarily in claiming competence and in considering inferiority complex as the main enemy.
In sum, contrary to expectations, the discourse of these two illiberal and authoritarian leaders is largely positive. This does not mean that they project a Pollyannish, ever-optimistic image of the world. In fact, they frequently address phenomena they perceive negatively. But they turn negativity into positivity through various rhetorical means and arguments. Their audiences are told that these leaders can shelter them from negative developments in the world as they combine loyalty to historical values with competence and professionalism, and that the regained sovereignty allows their countries to follow their own path. References to historical defeats highlight resilience. Both leaders present their countries as islands of peace and freedom in a world gone mad, and they argue that their parties’ rule ushers in a new historical period. They project unity between party and nation, and they claim moral superiority over their liberal opponents by promoting a communitarian spirit over individualism. They also associate governmental achievements with the nationalist, conservative, and anti-communist values of their parties, blending performance-based and ideological justifications.
Challenging the Status Quo
Illiberal, authoritarian actors in office need to project stability and success to secure reelection. They do so by expressing belief in the strength of the community and in the competence of the leaders. This self-confidence is combined with moral self-righteousness, engendering a fundamentally optimistic outlook. The protest rhetoric is not discarded; is integrated in the main message of the leaders’ ability to govern.
The position of illiberal actors in Europe is not easy. They are surrounded by liberal democratic arrangements, including international law, free markets, and cross-border mobility. They face academic and media elites that consider multiculturalism and the emancipation of (especially sexual) minorities as morally valuable and inevitable aspects of social development, modernization, and the march of time. To promote their views in this environment, opponents of liberal democracy must challenge the inevitability argument. They argue that a homogeneous society in the 21st century is not only possible but also compatible with (or even conducive to) economic prosperity, efficient state management, safety, individual happiness, and technological development. Given that illiberal authoritarian forces are still in minority in the EU, their positive appeals are used to project their ability to buck the trend.
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For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper titled “They can do it. Positive Authoritarianism in Poland and Hungary” in Frontiers in Political Science.
Authors:
Franziska Wagner is doctoral candidate in political science at Central European University.
Zsolt Enyedi is professor of political science at Central European University.
The AUTHLIB consortium does not take collective positions. Publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
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Photo credit: Lukasz Michalczyk via Shutterstock
